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Interpretation of High
Projections for Global-Mean
Warming
T. M. L. Wigley1* and S. C. B. Raper2
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has recently released
its Third Assessment Report (TAR), in which new projections are given for
global-mean warming in the absence of policies to limit climate change. The full
warming range over 1990 to 2100, 1.4° to 5.8°C, is substantially higher than
the range given previously in the IPCC Second Assessment Report. Here we
interpret the new warming range in probabilistic terms, accounting for uncer-
tainties in emissions, the climate sensitivity, the carbon cycle, ocean mixing, and
aerosol forcing. We show that the probabilities of warming values at both the
high and low ends of the TAR range are very low. In the absence of climate-
mitigation policies, the 90% probability interval for 1990 to 2100 warming is
1.7° to 4.9°C.
The Third Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (1)
gives new projections for global-mean
warming in the absence of policies to limit
climate change, based on a new set of
emissions scenarios, the SRES scenarios
(2, 3). The full warming range over 1990 to
2100, 1.4° to 5.8°C (4 ), obtained by using
a simple upwelling-diffusion energy-bal-
ance climate model (5, 6 ) calibrated against
the results of seven state-of-the-art coupled
atmosphere–ocean general circulation
models (AOGCMs) (4, 7 ), is substantially
higher than the range given for the earlier
IS92 scenarios in the IPCC Second Assess-
ment Report (SAR), 0.8° to 3.5°C (8). This
change is largely due to the new emissions
scenarios [particularly emissions of sulfur
dioxide (SO2)], the incorporation of cli-
mate feedbacks in modeling the carbon cy-
cle (9), improved relationships between ra-
diative forcing and greenhouse-gas abun-
dances (10), more comprehensive treat-
ments of methane and tropospheric ozone
(11), the direct use of AOGCM results (12),
and different assumed rates of slowdown of
the ocean’s thermohaline circulation
(THC) (4 ). As noted by Schneider (3),
Jones (13), and Moss and Schneider (14 ),
giving only a range of warming results is
potentially misleading unless some guid-
ance is given as to what the range means in
probabilistic terms (15). The purpose of
this paper is to provide such guidance.
A common method used to present re-
sults probabilistically is to employ a prob-
ability density function ( p.d.f.), p(x), where
the integral of p(x) between x1 and x2 gives
the probability of x lying in that range. This
is the method we use here. The procedure is
as follows: first, identify the main sources
of uncertainty; second, represent these un-
certain elements as p.d.f.s; third, use select-
ed values from these input p.d.f.s to drive a
suitable climate model; and finally, com-
bine the various climate model results into
an output p.d.f. In the terminology of Moss
and Schneider (14 ), this is a Bayesian type
of analysis in that the input p.d.f.s must
contain some subjective elements. The
transfer from input values to output, how-
ever, is deterministic, because our climate
model (unlike more complex AOGCMs)
translates inputs directly into an output
temperature “signal” with no internally
generated “noise” component.
Generating p.d.f.s for projected global
warming requires knowledge (or at least
credible estimates) of the p.d.f.s of many
different uncertain quantities or model pa-
rameters that may influence future warming
rates. We consider a limited subset of these,
which we show capture the main contribu-
tions to output uncertainty. We do not con-
sider the effect of possible structural uncer-
tainties in our climate model, nor factors
that our model cannot capture (such as gas
cycle or climate “surprises”—rapid chang-
es arising from nonlinearities in environ-
mental systems). As discussed in (13) and
(14 ), accounting for these would lead to
wider uncertainty limits than given by our
results.
Probabilistic inputs. The input parame-
ters that contribute most to uncertainties in
the projections of global-mean temperature
are as follows: the emissions of the various
gases that are directly or indirectly radia-
tively active; the transfer functions that
relate emissions to abundances to forcing;
the sensitivity of the climate system to
external forcing (i.e., the “climate sensitiv-
ity,” characterized by the equilibrium glo-
bal-mean warming for a doubling of the
CO2 level, DT 23); and ocean mixing fac-
tors that determine the lags between forcing
and response. Previous studies (4, 8, 16 –
19) have concluded that uncertainties in
future emissions and in the climate sensi-
tivity are the most important of these fac-
tors. The next most important factor ap-
pears to be the carbon cycle (17 ), uncer-
tainties in which have been quantified more
rigorously in the TAR than previously (9).
Emissions uncertainties, using transfer
functions from emissions to abundances to
forcing as formulated in the TAR, give a
1990 to 2100 total forcing range of ;3.1 to
8.1 W/m2. For any given value of the cli-
mate sensitivity, this forcing range implies
a range of values for 1990 to 2100 warm-
ing. Similarly, for any given forcing there
is a range of possible warming values due
to uncertainties in the climate sensitivity.
Both ranges are similar in magnitude (4, 8,
20). In other words, emissions and sensi-
tivity uncertainties have similar conse-
quences for global-mean temperature. If
carbon cycle uncertainties are quantified in
terms of radiative forcing, the forcing range
across all 35 SRES scenarios is expanded
by ;1.9 W/m2. Although this is much
smaller than the 3.1 to 8.1 W/m2 forcing
range that characterizes emissions uncer-
tainties, it is still considerably larger than
the uncertainty ranges arising from other
sources (17, 18, 21).
The other sources of uncertainty that we
consider here are radiative forcing due to
aerosols, particularly sulfate aerosols, and
ocean mixing (i.e., the efficiency with
which heat is transported from the surface
into the deeper ocean). The present-day
uncertainty range for aerosol forcing is
very large. However, this has only a rela-
tively small effect on future warming for
most of the SRES scenarios, mainly be-
cause of the 21st-century declines in SO2
emissions that are typical of these scenarios
(21, 22). (This contrasts with the SAR,
where large 21st-century increases in SO2
emissions under the IS92 scenarios led to
large aerosol-related uncertainties in glo-
bal-warming projections.) For ocean mix-
ing, the two determinants in our climate
model are the vertical diffusivity and
changes in the intensity of the THC. THC
changes in our simulations are tied directly
to the climate sensitivity (see below) be-
cause higher sensitivity AOGCMs have
more rapid declines in the THC [(4 ), Ap-
pendix 9.1)]. We therefore consider only
uncertainties in the vertical diffusivity,
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which we know a priori have only a minor
effect on warming projections (16 ).
We now have five factors for which we
must estimate p.d.f.s to drive our climate-
model projections. For emissions, the
SRES report (2) states that “There is no
single most likely, ‘central,’ or ‘best-guess’
scenario, either with respect to SRES sce-
narios or to the underlying literature” and
does not assign probabilities or likelihoods
to individual scenarios [(see also (3)]. We
therefore assume all 35 emissions scenarios
to be equally likely. This leads to a rather
uneven distribution of input radiative forc-
ings, as shown in Fig. 1.
For the climate sensitivity, the range of
values used in the IPCC TAR temperature
projections is 1.7° to 4.2°C (4). This is de-
rived from the set of seven AOGCMs upon
which the range of future warmings in the
TAR is based. These values do not span the
full range of possible sensitivities, as is noted
in the TAR (4). In previous IPCC work, the
standard uncertainty range given is 1.5° to
4.5°C, but no confidence interval has been
stated. We assume here that 1.5° to 4.5°C
corresponds to the 90% confidence interval
(23). We consider two different p.d.f.s, a
uniform distribution and a log-normal distri-
bution (Fig. 2).
To define the log-normal distribution ful-
ly, we also prescribe the median sensitivity.
In previous IPCC assessments, the best-esti-
mate sensitivity value has been assumed to be
2.5°C, which implies that the distribution is
skewed to the left. We assume a slightly less
skewed distribution here, using the median
sensitivity of the seven TAR AOGCMs
(2.6°C) as our median value.
The third uncertainty factor we consider
is the carbon cycle. The carbon cycle model
we use here is that of Wigley (24 ), as
employed in both the TAR (4 ) and SAR
(8). The model includes both CO2 fertiliza-
tion and climate feedbacks. For the TAR,
the model’s climate feedbacks were tuned
to give atmospheric CO2 abundances for
the SRES scenarios that closely matched
those for other models (25, 26 ) used else-
where in the TAR. In the TAR temperature
projections, uncertainties in these feed-
backs were not considered. This gave a
range of 2100 abundance projections across
the SRES scenarios of 540 to 970 parts per
million ( ppm). The full uncertainty range
given in the TAR (9), accounting for feed-
back uncertainties, is 490 to 1260 ppm. To
cover this full uncertainty range here, we
defined p.d.f.s for the parameters in our
carbon cycle model that gave 490 to 1260
ppm as the extreme range over all 35 emis-
sions scenarios. We found that, for any
emissions scenario, the output distribution
of CO2 abundances could be well simulated
by applying simple linearly time-dependent
scaling factors to the central estimate used
for the TAR temperature projections.
(Time-dependent scaling is necessary be-
cause the uncertainty range must increase
as time increases.) This allows a consider-
able simplification in the calculations re-
quired to determine the relative importance
of carbon-cycle model uncertainties and
produces results that are consistent with the
uncertainty range estimated in the TAR.
For aerosol forcing (the sum of direct
and indirect sulfate, biomass, and carbona-
ceous aerosols (4 )], we employed the TAR
central estimate (21.3 W/m2 in 1990) as
the median for a log-normal p.d.f. and
chose 5 and 95% limits of 20.3 W/m2 and
21.9 W/m2, using uncertainty estimates
given in the TAR together with constraints
based on fitting our climate model to ob-
served global- and hemispheric-mean tem-
peratures [(compare with (27 )]. For ocean-
ic vertical diffusivity, we also assumed a
log-normal p.d.f. with 5, 50, and 95% val-
ues of 1.3, 2.3, and 4.1 cm2/s, on the basis
of results given in the TAR [(4 ), Appendix
9.1]. Because our output temperature p.d.f.s
are insensitive to aerosol forcing and diffu-
sivity uncertainties (see below), uncertain-
ties in the above two p.d.f.s are relatively
unimportant.
Climate model results. The climate
model used here is the same as that used in
the TAR (4–6). Simulations run from 1765
to 2100. The full set of SRES emissions
scenarios, together with p.d.f.s that capture
carbon cycle and aerosol forcing uncertain-
ties, give a wide range of radiative forcing
projections that drive this model (28). The
model itself requires specific values to be set
for a number of different parameters [(4),
Appendix 9.1)] For climate sensitivity and
vertical diffusivity we used p.d.f.s as de-
scribed above. All other parameters were lin-
early interpolated as functions of sensitivity,
preserving the values that corresponded to the
highest and lowest sensitivity cases. This is a
useful simplifying procedure that has no no-
ticeable effect on the results presented below,
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Fig. 1. Frequency of occurrence
of different 1990 to 2100 radia-
tive forcing ranges under the
SRES emissions scenarios based
on TAR relationships between
emissions, abundances, and radi-
ative forcings. Because of cli-
mate feedbacks on the carbon
cycle, the precise forcing for any
given scenario depends on the
warming, which, in turn, depends
on the assumed climate sensitiv-
ity. The values here use a sensi-
tivity of DT 23 5 2.6°C.
Fig. 2. Distribution functions
(probability densities) assumed
for the climate sensitivity, ex-
pressed as the equilibrium
warming for 23CO2 (DT 23).
Both cases have 1.5° to 4.5°C as
the 90% probability interval.
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primarily because of the dominant influence
of the climate sensitivity.
To obtain climate model output results
in terms of probability distributions, results
for each of the 35 SRES emissions scenar-
ios were given equal weight, and the p.d.f.s
for climate sensitivity, CO2 abundance,
aerosol forcing, and oceanic vertical diffu-
sivity were divided into equiprobable frac-
tiles. Temperature projections were then
made with parameter values corresponding
to the median of each fractile. We used 25
fractiles for climate sensitivity and quin-
tiles for the three other factors (requiring
109,375 climate model simulations for our
final results). We refer to this method as
Exhaustive Fractile Sampling, because it
considers all possible combinations of re-
sults for the division of the input distribu-
tions into prespecified fractiles. It is similar
to the commonly used method of Latin
Hypercube Sampling (29), in which fractile
combinations are chosen by random
sampling.
Figure 3 gives the distributions of 1990
to 2100 warming for three cases: (i) all
emissions scenarios plus a uniform p.d.f.
for climate sensitivity and single (median)
values for all other parameters; (ii) as in (i),
but using a log-normal p.d.f. for sensitivity;
(iii) as in (ii), but including carbon cycle
uncertainty effects. The output distribu-
tions are very similar, demonstrating that
the results are robust to uncertainties in the
shape of the input distribution for climate
sensitivity, and that the effect of incorpo-
rating carbon cycle uncertainties into the
assessment is minor. The differences be-
tween the three distributions are illustrated
in terms of specific percentiles in Table 1.
The fact that the log-normal distribution is
skewed to the left and has a lower median
than the uniform distribution (2.6°C versus
3.0°C) shifts the output temperature distri-
bution slightly to the left relative to the
uniform p.d.f. case. When carbon cycle
uncertainties are included, the low and (es-
pecially) high tails of the distribution are
expanded (Fig. 3 and Table 1), and the
probability of large warming is increased.
Figure 4 shows how the distribution of
warming changes with time for the log-
normal sensitivity case with carbon cycle,
aerosol forcing, and diffusivity uncertain-
ties included. Comparison with Fig. 3
shows that the addition of aerosol and dif-
fusivity uncertainties has little effect on the
results. (The differences are quantified in
Table 1.) As expected, the uncertainty
range increases with time. Even for chang-
es over 1990 to 2030, there is considerable
uncertainty; the 90% probability interval is
0.5° to 1.2°C (for changes over 2000 to
2030, subtract 0.2°C). The median project-
ed warming rate, 0.20°C/decade, is compa-
rable to the warming rate that has occurred
over the past 25 years (30). By 2100, the
90% probability interval for warming from
1990 has expanded to 1.7° to 4.9°C; and the
median warming rate over 1990 to 2100 is
0.28°C/decade. Comparing this interval
with the range 1.4° to 5.8°C given in the
IPCC TAR shows that warming at the high
and low ends of this range is unlikely.
Another more salutary comparison is be-
tween the median 1990 to 2100 warming
rate and the observed warming rate over the
past 100 years of ;0.06°C/decade. The
projected median warming rate is approxi-
mately five times that of the past.
Caveats and conclusions. The results
Fig. 3. Sensitivity of the distribu-
tion of global-mean warming
over 1990 to 2100 to the as-
sumed distribution function for
climate sensitivity [compare
LOG-NORMAL (dotted line) and
UNIFORM (crosses)], and to the
inclusion of the effects of carbon
cycle uncertainties [compare
LOG-NORMAL and LOG PLUS
CO2 (bold line)]. Warming distri-
butions have been smoothed
with a 1:2:1 binomial filter. The
bar under the temperature axis
shows the IPCC TAR range.
Fig. 4. Evolution of uncertainties
in global-mean warming, illus-
trated by warming distributions
over 1990 to 2030 (dotted line),
1990 to 2070 (crosses), and
1990 to 2100 (bold line). This is
the log-normal sensitivity case
with carbon cycle, ocean mixing,
and aerosol forcing uncertainties
included. Warming distributions
have been smoothed with a
1:2:1 binomial filter. The bar un-
der the temperature axis shows
the IPCC TAR 1990 to 2100
warming range. For the
2100 p.d.f., the probability of
warming less than 1.4°C is 1.7%,
and of warming above 5.8°C is
0.6%. The 2030 result is similar
to that of (40).
Table 1. Percentile values for global-mean warming (°C) from 1990 to the year indicated. Top two rows:
1990 to 2100 warming for different assumed climate sensitivity distributions (uniform and log-normal)
accounting for emissions and sensitivity uncertainties only. Third row (Log 1 CO2): same as row 2, but
also accounting for carbon cycle uncertainties. Bottom three rows (Log 1 all): same as row 3, but also
accounting for ocean mixing and aerosol forcing uncertainties.
Case Year
Percentile
1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
Uniform 2100 1.40 1.74 2.53 3.18 3.92 4.95 5.43
Log-normal 2100 1.37 1.71 2.40 3.00 3.69 4.71 5.26
Log 1 CO2 2100 1.34 1.71 2.44 3.07 3.78 4.84 5.52
Log 1 all 2100 1.29 1.68 2.42 3.06 3.78 4.87 5.61
Log 1 all 2070 1.03 1.29 1.77 2.17 2.62 3.34 3.82
Log 1 all 2030 0.36 0.48 0.66 0.80 0.95 1.17 1.31
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presented here place the warming range given
in the TAR into a more realistic context by
expressing the range in probabilistic form,
accounting for emissions, climate sensitivity,
carbon cycle, aerosol forcing, and ocean-mix-
ing uncertainties. Our analysis is similar in
principle to that of Titus and Narayanan [see
figure 12 in (31)] in their assessment of future
uncertainties in sea-level rise under the IS92
emissions scenarios, but we use more recent
emissions scenarios and consider a wider
range of input uncertainty factors.
Our results are only as realistic as the
assumptions upon which they are based:
that the SRES emissions scenarios are a
realistic reflection of the range of emissions
possibilities under a no-climate-policy as-
sumption (32); that the TAR estimates of
atmospheric composition and radiative
forcing changes under these scenarios (9 –
11) (used here as our median values) are
accurate; and that the AOGCMs used in the
TAR as a basis for calibrating our simpler
climate model (4 ) give realistic tempera-
ture responses. We have noted also that our
analysis does not consider model structure
uncertainties (beyond those that are cap-
tured by changing model parameter val-
ues), nor possible climate “surprises,” both
of which may lead to wider uncertainty
ranges.
The assumption that the SRES scenarios
are all equally likely warrants further in-
vestigation. Forcing for the higher emis-
sions scenarios may be reduced if better
account were taken of policies introduced
in response to environmental changes other
than climate. The SRES scenarios consider
such policies comprehensively for SO2
emissions projections, but not for tropo-
spheric ozone precursors. Some of the
high-emissions scenarios imply very high
future tropospheric ozone levels (11), so
accounting for responses to ozone-related
pollution could reduce future radiative
forcing in these cases by up to 1 W/m2 by
2100.
An additional factor that might lead to
lower emissions and radiative forcing at the
high end of the SRES range is the possible
effect of climate change on our ability to
sustain the levels of economic growth as-
sumed in these scenarios (33). Although
climate feedbacks of this type are included
in a number of integrated assessment mod-
els (34 –36 ), their effect on the global econ-
omy for the high warming rates that are
suggested here is unknown.
In summary, we have shown that the
very high upper-limit warming rate of
about 0.5°C/decade given in the IPCC TAR
(4 ) is much less likely than warmings in the
center of the distribution, which are about
0.3°C/decade. Even warming at this rate,
however, is very large compared with the
observed warming over the past century,
and considerably larger than the rate of
warming suggested in the IPCC SAR (8). In
many of the scenarios considered, the rate
of warming is still high at the end of the
21st century; further warming through the
22nd century would be virtually certain in
these cases. Whether or not such rapid
warming will occur and be sustained de-
pends, of course, on actions taken to con-
trol climate change. If the near future were
to follow a rapid warming pathway, and the
expected impacts were to occur, it is likely
that mitigation efforts would be initiated
rapidly in the hope of reducing the rate and
magnitude of change. Inertia in the climate
system would, however, lead to only a slow
response to such efforts and guarantee that
future warming would still be large (37 ).
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